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I. INTRODUCTION
Isaiah Berlin famously preferred the fox to the hedgehog. The
hedgehog, who “knows one big thing,” is essentially the monist, seeking
to reduce moral complexity to a single formula that will answer all
ethical and political questions.1 For Berlin, this approach to the moral
world is both false and dangerous: false because human conduct and
values are too complex to be captured in this way; dangerous because
the attempt to do so carries the risk of forcing people into categories that
ignore or distort their real wishes and needs. We are better off, at least
when it comes to politics, with the fox. The pluralist fox, knowing
“many things,” appreciates the irreducible diversity of human experience

* Professor of Political Theory, Flinders University.
1. ISAIAH BERLIN, The Hedgehog and the Fox, in RUSSIAN THINKERS 24, 24
(Henry Hardy & Aileen Kelly eds., Penguin Books 2d ed. 2008) (1978).
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and the impossibility of translating all of this into a single system.2 The
fox leaves us with hard choices to make when different perspectives and
principles come into conflict, but this is a more honest reflection of our
reality. The clear, smooth decision procedures of the hedgehog come at
too high a price.
A stimulating challenge to this view has been issued by Ronald
Dworkin, who writes: “There are indeed dangers in the hedgehog, but
we must not forget that there are dangers in the fox as well.”3 Great evil
has been done by people determined to impose their single-minded
vision on a recalcitrant world, but the opposite idea has also been
harmful: when important political values conflict, every choice involves
“sacrifices in some of the things we care about” such that no one choice
is better than another.4 We are faced with poverty, even in the midst of
plenty, but some people argue that our capacity to change this is limited
because “if we were to raise taxes to the level necessary to address
poverty in any serious way, then we would be invading liberty.”5 If
liberty and equality conflict and neither should be regarded as dominant,
then it seems that no response is more compelling than any other. The
pluralist outlook appears to invite paralysis in the face of injustice.
This concern motivates Dworkin’s further argument that Berlinian
pluralism is in any case not true, or at least that we have no conclusive
reason to believe in its truth. The pluralist “purports to see to the bottom
of a dilemma and see that there is no escape. Are we ever entitled to so
ambitious a claim?”6 Dworkin’s answer is no. Before we can properly
reach the pluralist conclusion, we must first be sure that there really can
be no acceptable formula that reconciles or ranks what seem to be
contending values. Might it not be that liberty and equality do not truly
conflict when these goods are properly understood? Dworkin believes
that there are signs of progress in this direction and that, at any rate,
pluralists have a long way to go before they can demonstrate that such a
project is doomed to failure. In effect, the onus of proof is on pluralists
and they have not yet discharged it.
How might pluralists reply? First, they might argue that in this debate
the onus of proof is not on pluralism but on monism because pluralism
has appearances on its side. As Berlin points out, our “ordinary
experience” is of a world of moral conflicts that are often hard and

2.
3.

Id.
Ronald Dworkin, Do Liberal Values Conflict?, in THE LEGACY
BERLIN 73, 75 (Mark Lilla, Ronald Dworkin & Robert Silvers eds., 2001).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 81.
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sometimes impossible to resolve rationally.7 It may be that this is mere
appearance concealing a monist reality, that behind the phenomena of
conflict and dilemma, we may still find the formula that would fix
everything. But after two millennia of Western philosophy, the monist
formula is yet to be found, and one may question how much progress
towards it has really been made. If appearances are misleading, then is
the onus not on monists to show us why and how? If so, that onus has
not been discharged.
So, if Dworkin is right about the indeterminate and paralysing
character of pluralism then that may just be, as Al Gore would say, “an
inconvenient truth.” But is Dworkin right about that? My general task
in this paper is to argue that he is not. The background worry that
motivates Dworkin’s attack on the truth of pluralism is misplaced.
Pluralism is not the field of indeterminacy and reform paralysis that he
supposes it to be.
More specifically, I argue this point with reference to the question of
justice in economic distribution. Using the liberal-pluralist framework I
have developed elsewhere, I try to show that a value-pluralist approach
to distributive justice, far from leading to inaction or acquiescence in
existing patterns of power, commends a program of egalitarian
redistribution—thus far, a position much like that of Dworkin himself.
Matters get more complex when one asks what kind of egalitarianism is
most in keeping with pluralism. Here Dworkin is again centre stage as a
leading figure in the debate between rival welfare, resource, and capabilitybased views. In this debate, I align pluralism most closely with the
capabilities approach while acknowledging the reach of Dworkin’s
arguments in favour of resources.
I begin by summarising my version of liberal pluralism, emphasising
that the notion of pluralism implies not only value conflicts and hard
choices but also a set of normative principles that are capable of guiding
public policy. I then use that framework to adjudicate between rival
approaches to distributive justice within liberalism, starting with the
basic division between laissez-faire and egalitarian-redistributive
approaches and proceeding to the leading alternatives within
egalitarianism.

7. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166, 213–14 (2002).
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II. LIBERAL PLURALISM
In my view, Berlinian pluralism is best reflected in politics by
liberalism. Indeed, pluralism provides a rational and ethical foundation
for liberalism: if pluralism is true it gives us a set of reasons to support a
liberal form of politics. Moreover, these reasons will be valid not just
locally but universally. This set of claims is what I mean by “liberal
pluralism.” The following is a bare outline of the main moves in my
argument for this position, the details of which are available elsewhere.8
The idea of pluralism as I understand it consists of four main
elements: universality, plurality, conflict, and incommensurability.9
First, there are certain fundamental values that are universal and
objective in the sense that they contribute to human well-being. Such
values must be conceived at a high level of abstraction because they may
be instantiated in different ways in different circumstances or cultures.
Their precise content is open to dispute, but plausible accounts have
been offered by John Kekes and by Martha Nussbaum in her theory of
human capabilities.10 Second, the components or dimensions of human
well-being are irreducibly plural or distinct from one another. Third,
these plural values may in particular cases come into conflict. For
example, liberty may sometimes be increased only by sacrificing some
degree of equality.
Fourth, and most distinctively, pluralism holds not only that values
may sometimes collide, but also that they may be “incommensurable.”
No basic value is inherently superior to any other, and none can serve as
a common currency in terms of which other values can be quantified.
No amount of one incommensurable value will wholly compensate for
the loss of another. Pluralism therefore opposes two kinds of monism:
first, the view that a single value overrides all others in all cases; second,
the view that all values can be translated into amounts of a common
currency. Preference utilitarianism might serve as an example of either
8. See, e.g., GEORGE CROWDER, ISAIAH BERLIN: LIBERTY AND PLURALISM (2004);
GEORGE CROWDER, LIBERALISM AND VALUE PLURALISM (2002) [hereinafter CROWDER,
LIBERALISM]; George Crowder, Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism, 35 POL. THEORY 121
(2007).
9. Useful accounts of pluralism are contained in: ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY (Henry
Hardy ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter BERLIN, LIBERTY]; ISAIAH BERLIN, THE
CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (Henry Hardy ed.,
1990) [hereinafter BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER]; WILLIAM A. GALSTON, THE PRACTICE
OF LIBERAL PLURALISM (2005); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE (2002); JOHN
KEKES, THE MORALITY OF PLURALISM (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
(1986); HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS (1994).
10. K EKES , supra note 9; M ARTHA C. N USSBAUM , W OMEN AND H UMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000).
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of these, depending on whether it is interpreted as placing preferencesatisfaction at the top of a hierarchy of values or as proposing
preference-satisfaction as a common currency for all goods. In either
case, pluralists will regard the satisfaction of preferences as, at best,
merely one value among others—a value grounding claims of its own
that are, prima facie, no more fundamental or authoritative than claims
based on liberty or equality.
Pluralism must also be distinguished from ethical or cultural relativism.
Relativists tend to see ethical claims as expressing discrete, perhaps
incommensurable perspectives, whether of individuals or cultures or
other groups. Pluralists by contrast acknowledge a single, universal
perspective on human morality, but see this as complex, involving
conflicts among goods both within and across particular perspectives.11
Because of the pluralist emphasis on value conflict and
incommensurability, however, the question arises of how, under
pluralism, we can choose among values when they conflict. The
literature contains various responses to this problem. One widespread
response, which might be called the “agonistic” view, assumes that if
values are incommensurable then choice among them must be
nonrational.12 But although incommensurable values cannot be ranked
in the abstract, or in accordance with a single order that applies in every
case, the evidence of moral experience is that there may be good reason
to rank competing incommensurables in particular cases. If liberty and
equality are incommensurables, it may still be true that a greater
emphasis on one or the other is justified by the traditions or circumstances
of a particular society. This can be called the “contextual” approach to
pluralist choice.13 Its weakness from a liberal point of view is that it
makes respect for key values, such as those embodied in human rights,

11. See generally Isaiah Berlin, Note on Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century
European Thought, 3 BRIT. J. FOR EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 89 (1990), reprinted in
BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER, supra note 9, at 70 (distinguishing pluralism and
relativism). See also STEVEN LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
DIVERSITY 100–06 (2003).
12. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, PLURALISM (2005); WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY,
IDENTITY\DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX (expanded
ed. 1991); JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 62 (1996); CHANTAL MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL
(2005); CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2000).
13. See, e.g., BERLIN, LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 47; GRAY, supra note 12, at 154–
55; KEKES, supra note 9, at 77.
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too dependent on cultural and other contingencies—it threatens to
relativise the foundations of liberalism.
In my view, the best option for liberal pluralists is what I call the
“conceptual” account of pluralist choice. Reflection on the concept of
pluralism itself yields principles capable of guiding ethical and political
choices across a generality of cases. The principles I have in mind are
not precise formulas for determining every specific ethical or political
question. Pluralism rejects such formulas. Rather, these general
principles serve to frame particular decisions, to narrow down the range
of acceptable options. I believe they indicate a distinctively liberal
framework within which more fine-grained choices remain to be made.
The salient principles in this respect are four in number: respect for
value plurality, promotion of a diversity of goods, accommodation of
reasonable disagreement concerning the good life, and facilitation of
individual autonomy.
The first of these principles, respect for value plurality, is the most
general and conditions all of the others. For pluralists, the human good
consists of many distinct dimensions, each of which makes its own
unique ethical claim on us. To acknowledge value pluralism is to
respect each of those claims on its own terms. Further, I assume that to
respect each claim is to hold in principle that it ought to be acted upon.
Consequently, to respect value plurality is to accept that, prima facie, all
such values have an equal claim to promotion in action.14
I say “prima facie” because, obviously, no single person or society can
promote every good in the human spectrum to the same extent and
simultaneously. Justice may conflict with mercy or reconciliation;
solidarity and belonging may conflict with independence and self-reliance.
Nevertheless, we can still respect a good even when choosing against it
by insisting that we should, as far as possible, choose against a genuine
good only when we have good reason to do so. To choose against a
good simply by ignoring it, or by some arbitrary decision procedure like
tossing a coin, is to fail to take seriously the claim that this good has
14. A possible objection to my view is that if plural values are incommensurable
then their claims cannot be said to be equal. It is true that if values are incommensurable
then they cannot be measurably equal. For example, it is not true that they are all worth,
say, four units of value. Nevertheless, it still makes sense to say that they possess equal
status. I take it that this is what Berlin means when he refers to incommensurable ends
as “equally ultimate.” BERLIN, LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 213. One can draw an analogy with
the equal moral worth of human beings: all human beings possess a fundamental equality
of moral worth even though we cannot measure this. They do not all possess four units
of moral worth, but they all have equal status as moral beings. Another way of putting
the point may be to say that if values are incommensurable, then there is no reason to
rank one ahead of another unless or until a specific context gives us such a reason—they
possess prima facie or presumptively equal status.
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upon us, and so to fail to take seriously the full range of human values.
The pluralist outlook thus implies a commitment to practical reasoning.
Respect for value plurality suggests a second, more substantial
principle, that of “value diversity.” If to respect a given value is to
promote it in action, and if there are many such values each with its own
unique claim on us, then in a given situation we ought, again prima
facie, to promote as many of these values as we can—unless and until
we have reason to select some rather than others. In other words
pluralism raises a presumption in favour of promoting a wider rather
than narrower range of goods, at any rate at the level of a society.15 I
think this is what Bernard Williams means when he writes that “the
greater the extent to which a society tends to be single-valued, the more
genuine values it neglects or suppresses. More, to this extent, must
mean better.”16 The presumption in favour of greater diversity can be
rebutted, but only for good reason. Given a commitment to diversity in
this sense, pluralists have reason to support liberalism. The pluralist
outlook would surely favour, for example, the more accommodating
environments of liberal democracies over the straitened worlds created
by Fascist or Communist dictatorships.17
Here I depart from John Gray’s view that pluralism implies the
desirability of a world characterised by a diversity of political cultures,
some liberal, some not.18 Gray’s position assumes that pluralism is
primarily about the incommensurability of cultures. But if that were
15. Different considerations may apply at the level of an individual life, but that is
an issue I cannot pursue here.
16. Bernard Williams, Introduction to ISAIAH BERLIN, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES:
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, at xi, xvii (Henry Hardy ed., 1978).
17. Here it may be objected that liberalism does not clearly promote a desirable
diversity of values because it makes more space not only for goods but also for evils.
JOHN KEKES, AGAINST LIBERALISM 23–45 (1997). At best this looks like the beginning
of a longer conversation rather than a conclusive point because it opens up many
questions. For example, what evils are we talking about here? How do we know they
are evils? What is their relation with goods—do they cancel out goods somehow?
Supposing we have a single-valued or single-good-life society, would that produce fewer
evils than a liberal society? The distinctive feature of liberalism, compared with alternative
political systems, is its emphasis on personal liberty. On the face of it this may seem to
leave more room for people to make mistakes, but what are the alternatives and how
have they fared in human experience? In my judgment, these alternatives are even more
vulnerable to the making of mistakes and therefore the promoting of evil. We are likely
to have fewer mistakes, or fewer mistakes with major consequences, for great numbers
of people if we leave people a good deal of freedom to decide for themselves how to live
rather than authorising others to decide for them.
18. GRAY, supra note 12, at 152.
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true, pluralism would be merely a form of cultural relativism: if whole
ways of life were incommensurable, then each would be uniquely
valuable and therefore immune to criticism except on its own terms.
Such an understanding of cultures is both unrealistic, because cultures
have always interacted and overlapped, and inconsistent with the
pluralist view that at least some goods are universals. What is distinctive
and correct about pluralism is its emphasis on the incommensurability
and multiplicity of values rather than cultures.19 Given that emphasis, a
major problem with Gray’s conclusion is that some political cultures are
more accommodating of value diversity than others. Contrary to Gray’s
view, liberalism occupies a privileged position in relation to diversity—
the liberal emphasis on individual liberty opens up social spaces in
which a greater range of goods can be pursued than is the case in
alternative political forms.20
Note too that the goods in question include not only the generic
universals mentioned earlier but also more specific interpretations of
those fundamental goods in particular cultural, political, and personal
settings. Liberty and equality, for example, are complex goods with
different dimensions, which may themselves be incommensurable with
one another, and each of these may be understood differently in different
social and personal situations. This means that the value diversity
commended by pluralists, although in part requiring that a society do its
best to ensure that its people enjoy the basic components of human wellbeing in whatever form, goes beyond this to accommodate and
encourage multiple ways of realising those dimensions of the good. On
this point, I see the pluralist outlook as consistent with John Stuart Mill’s
celebration of “individuality” and of those “experiments in living” that
nourish it.21
On the other hand, pluralist diversity cannot mean simply the
multiplication of values without regard to how they fit together. There
will be tensions within any system of values, but the elements of such a
system must exhibit some significant degree of compatibility or fit if
they are to sustain a society over a substantial period of time. Thus, the
19. This is not to say that pluralists do not recognise the value of multiple cultures
at all. On the contrary, so far as goods are incommensurable there will be more than one
legitimate way of combining them—more than one legitimate and valuable way of life.
But the diversity of cultures follows from the diversity of goods rather than the reverse;
it is the latter that conditions the former. So, respect for diverse goods takes precedence
over respect for diverse cultures or packages of goods.
20. For further critical discussion of Gray, see George Crowder, Gray and the
Politics of Pluralism, in THE POLITICAL THEORY OF JOHN GRAY 59 (John Horton & Glen
Newey eds., 2007).
21. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 147 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books
1974) (1859).
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pluralist ideal of value diversity can be understood in terms of a
tolerably coherent package of values that can be judged to express or
accommodate a greater range of human goods overall than the
alternatives.22
The third pluralist principle is that a good society should accommodate
reasonable disagreement about the good life. The view that this kind of
disagreement is widespread in modern societies, and that within certain
limits it ought to be accommodated, is central to contemporary liberal
theory.23 It is also very much in line with value pluralism. On the
pluralist view, conceptions of the good life can be thought of as
essentially schemes for combining and ranking basic human goods
across the life of a person or a society. If at least some basic values are
incommensurable, then many such general rankings will be prima facie
reasonable. Reasonable disagreement about the good ought to be
accommodated, on pluralist grounds, because the costs of alternative
policies are likely to be prohibitive, given a prior respect for value
plurality. Again, liberalism—with its commitment to toleration or, more
strongly, its positive support for multiculturalism within the limits of
individual rights—provides the best political vehicle for such
accommodation.
Finally, pluralism can be linked to liberalism by way of individual
autonomy. Respect for value plurality requires that when we have to
choose among competing incommensurable values, we should choose
for a good reason whenever possible. To choose for a good reason in
such a situation is to choose autonomously, through a process of critical
22. Patrick Neal has suggested that the “multiplicity” and “coherence” elements of
my account of value diversity contradict one another. See Patrick Neal, The Path
Between Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Order: Questioning the Connection, 46
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 859, 874–78 (2009). I do not see that this must be so. In general, the
strategy of qualifying one commitment with another, or making the first subject to the
second, is a familiar and valid move. An example is Rawls’s second principle of justice,
in which social and economic inequality is permissible on certain conditions. JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971). In the case of my diversity argument, there
would be an outright contradiction, rather than just a qualification, only if the coherence
consideration shows that maximisation does not matter at all—if it shows that having a
greater rather than lesser range of values is wholly unimportant. But I do not see that it
does show this. If the human good has several distinct components, then it would seem
better prima facie that more of these be promoted rather than fewer, and that more rather
than fewer be promoted in diverse ways. That presumption may be rebutted in cases
where promoting X will interfere with Y and Z. But that is surely a qualification and not
a contradiction of the basic presumption.
23. See e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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reflection.24 Just as we cannot resolve conflicts among incommensurables
simply by appealing to monist rules like utilitarianism, similarly, we
cannot rely on received practices or traditions alone to resolve our
difficulties—these too represent rankings of incommensurables that
reasonable people may contest. Any of these norms may be relevant in a
particular case, but the message of pluralism is that we must decide for
ourselves how to weigh such considerations in the case at hand. That is,
pluralism obliges us to think autonomously. And because individual
autonomy is one of the ideals most distinctive of liberalism, it is in a
liberal political order that the capacity for individual autonomy is most
likely to be encouraged.
This, then, is my basic case for a liberal reading of pluralism. To
respect the deep plurality of values is to accept that a good society ought
to promote value diversity, accommodate reasonable disagreement, and
foster individual autonomy. Such principles cannot, of course, be
overriding—they do not trump other considerations in every case. The
rejection of overriding values is the heart of pluralism. Consistent with
that fundamental point, however, broad principles can be derived from
pluralism that apply with enough regularity to impart a general shape to
a society’s politics and public morality. An example of this approach is
Berlin’s preference for negative liberty as a political ideal. This does not
mean that he proposes negative liberty as overriding other goods; on the
contrary, he explicitly rejects that possibility.25 Rather, it means that, for
Berlin, the general shape of a society’s institutions should owe more to
negative than to positive liberty. I would make a similar claim for
positive liberty in the form of individual autonomy.
III. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: LAISSEZ-FAIRE
Assuming that pluralists ought to be liberals, how should liberal
pluralists approach distributive justice? All liberals endorse private
property, and by extension the capitalist free market, as at least a
necessary starting point. Pluralists too should accept some significant
commitment to these institutions. They have reason to regard private
property and capitalism as inseparable from the personal liberty that is
commended by the principles of diversity, reasonable disagreement, and
individual autonomy. By contrast, they will see the distinctively
24. For accounts of individual autonomy centered on critical reflection, see MILL,
supra note 21; RAZ, supra note 9. Note that critical reflection need not be thought of as a
wholly rational process excluding any role for the emotions. As Mill writes: “He who
chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties,” including not only “reasoning
and judgment” but also “discriminative feeling.” MILL, supra note 21, at 122–23.
25. BERLIN, LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 38, 172.
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socialist commitment to public control of the economy, especially in its
stronger forms, as vulnerable to antipluralist tendencies such as the
domination of a society by the narrow will of a political party or a
dictator.26
But liberals differ over whether and to what extent capitalism should
be qualified or corrected. Classical or laissez-faire liberals favour a
highly restricted role for government, leaving individuals maximally
free—or obliged—to compete for resources through the market.
Egalitarian liberals reply that free market distribution is not a sufficient
basis for justice in distribution or for genuine freedom for all. Rather,
justice and freedom require active state intervention to correct market
distribution. Which of these views is more likely to be favoured from a
pluralist perspective?
An attempt to argue from pluralism to laissez-faire can be found in
Friedrich A. Hayek. His case against central economic planning includes
the claims that planning involves the ranking of basic goods, that there is
no uniquely correct way of doing this, and that consequently to impose
a single solution is to override people’s reasonable disagreement.27
From this, Hayek draws the conclusion that individuals ought to be left
free to make their own economic decisions rather than have a plan
imposed on them.28
There are two things wrong with this argument. First, the pluralist
idea that there are multiple incommensurable values does not imply that
there is no best way of ranking them in any circumstances. The
contextualist critique of agonism shows that although there is no optimal
ranking that applies in every case, that is consistent with holding that
one solution may be the most reasonable in a particular situation. A plan
that was sufficiently tailored to the circumstances may be justified even
if some people disagree.
Second, the upshot of Hayek’s view is in any case a ranking:
individual liberty is given priority as a matter of public policy. On
Hayek’s own interpretation of choice under pluralism as wholly
indeterminate, this is unjustified: if no ranking is ever better than any
other, then it would be no more rational to let individuals decide than to
impose a plan. But even on a more reasonable understanding of

26.
27.
28.

CROWDER, LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 146–48.
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 65 (1944).
Id. at 90–92.
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pluralism as allowing reasoned ranking in context, Hayek’s argument is
at best incomplete. He would still have to show that in the circumstances of
economic decisionmaking, it is always best to rely on the judgment of
individuals. This might be shown, but it does not follow from the fact of
value pluralism alone.
At this point a defender of economic laissez-faire might appeal to
another great name in the classical-liberal pantheon, Robert Nozick. If
we ask why economic distribution should be left entirely to the
unimpeded enterprise of individuals in the market, Nozick’s answer is
that individuals have rights to noninterference that amount to absolute
“side constraints” on all other claims.29 Such side constraints are
necessary to do justice to the fundamental idea of the inviolability of the
individual.30 Consequently, absolute rights of self-ownership generate
absolute entitlements to any holdings that people acquire, as long as they
do not thereby violate the same rights held by others.31 This theory of
“historical entitlement” comes into conflict with, and overrides,
“patterned” theories of justice in which goods are distributed according
to criteria such as equality of outcome, need, desert, and so forth.32
Nozick summarises his position with the slogan “liberty upsets patterns.”33
Nozick’s economic laissez-faire should be rejected by pluralists
because it is fundamentally monistic. It rests on an absolute hierarchy of
value in which individual liberty always and absolutely overrides
everything else—the patterns. This is made transparent by the famous
Wilt Chamberlain example, in which the reader’s agreement that liberty
is always more important than the values implicit in any pattern is
simply assumed.34 For Nozick, as H.L.A. Hart observes, “[s]o long as
rights are not violated it matters not for morality, short of catastrophe,
how a social system actually works, how individuals fare under it, what
needs it fails to meet or what misery or inequalities it produces.”35
Indeed, Nozick’s ethical basis is not only restricted to individual rights
but also to a narrow conception of rights as both inviolable and strictly
negative. Berlin makes the same criticism of laissez-faire more
generally when he refers to “[t]he bloodstained story of economic

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 32–33 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 150–53.
Id. at 155–60.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 161–62.
H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 77, 81 (Alan Ryan ed., 1979).
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individualism,” in Victorian Britain for example, as the result of a
monist elevation of negative liberty over all other considerations.36
It might be objected that Nozick is too extreme to be accepted as the
best representative of laissez-faire, which can be defended on the basis
not of negative liberty alone but of a parcel of goods. Markets have
been associated with various goods and virtues in addition to freedom,
including material prosperity, individual and group enterprise, selfreliance, prudence, trust, and respect for the rule of law and for due
process. Indeed, Deirdre McCloskey has argued recently that markets
not only depend on but also nourish all of the great classical and
Christian virtues—courage, prudence, justice, wisdom, faith, hope, and
charity.37 In part this is because practising the virtues is “‘smart
business’”—they inspire confidence in customers and other traders.38
But market dealings also provide scope for people to experience the
virtues as intrinsically valuable because a market exchange is also an
“occasion for virtue, an expression of solidarity across gender, social
class, ethnicity.”39
However, reliance on the market also has its drawbacks. To some
extent, this is only to be expected because one of the basic lessons of
pluralism is that no human arrangement is capable of containing or
expressing all genuine human values equally. Indeed, in some cases,
benefits bring costs as a matter of necessity because to emphasise one
good is necessarily to forego another, at least to some extent. For
example, one of the strengths of the market is commonly said to be that
it generates a powerful incentive to the production of desirable goods
through the profit motive. But the corollary of this is market failure
36. BERLIN, LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 38. Defenders of Nozick might object to my
description of him as a monist by pointing to Part III of Anarchy, State, and Utopia.
There Nozick rejects the idea that there is “one best society for everyone to live in.”
NOZICK, supra note 29, at 311. He goes on to present the minimal state as “a framework
for utopia” in which people are free to contract into or out of as many different kinds of
community as there are human personalities, including highly traditional or authoritarian
groups: “Though the framework is libertarian and laissez-faire, individual communities
within it need not be . . . .” Id. at 320. Nevertheless, the framework for all of this remains the
minimal state, which embodies the absolute priority Nozick gives to negative liberty.
Whether the inhabitants of Nozick’s utopia will reach the promised land depends entirely
on the degree of success they achieve in an unrestricted market or, failing that, on their
success in attracting charitable aid.
37. See DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE BOURGEOIS VIRTUES: ETHICS FOR AN AGE OF
COMMERCE 3 (2006).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 4.

785

CROWDER FINAL ARTICLE

12/28/2009 10:46 AM

where no such incentive exists, as in the case of “public goods” such as
clean air and national defense, where benefits cannot be confined to
paying customers.
Other important goods may be supplied by the market, but not equally
or fairly among those who arguably have a claim to them in terms of
fundamental needs or justice. Markets produce not only winners but
also losers—those who do poorly in market transactions, including those
who happen, through no fault of their own, to lack the skills, education,
health, or sheer luck that are necessary to flourish in that sphere. As
Rawls puts it, market rewards are to a considerable extent dependent on
accidents of endowment that are “arbitrary from a moral point of
view.”40 The benefits of the market, which are real, are achieved through
competition, but the consequence of this is undeserved inequality and
dependence for some.
Some critics have plausibly alleged that market systems are not only
neglectful of some goods and arbitrary in their distribution of others, but
also positively harmful to human well-being in various respects. One
does not have to be a Marxist to have some sympathy with the idea that
capitalist relationships can sometimes be exploitative or alienating, or
with the fear that market competition often encourages greed, selfishness,
materialism, superficiality, rootlessness, insecurity, and anxiety. This
side of capitalism has been strongly brought home to us by the recent
worldwide banking and financial crisis.
Many commentators would say that these problems are especially
prevalent in contemporary forms of capitalism that emphasise flexibility
and globalisation. Again, the drawbacks mirror the benefits. The new
global economy is widely celebrated for its capacity to adapt quickly to
consumer preferences because of its flexible practices, such as the
outsourcing of work to fixed-term or project-orientated contractors. But,
as Richard Sennett argues, greater flexibility in the workplace means in
effect more lives disrupted by downsizing and relocation, and a wider
culture summed up by the phrase “‘[n]o long term.’”41 Workers’ lives
are fragmented into temporary arrangements lacking a sense of “trust,
loyalty, and mutual commitment”—longer term values that are central to
the construction of a sustained identity.42 Hence, in Sennett’s view, the
new capitalism leads to “the corrosion of character.”
Moreover, the critics allege that the values and virtues undermined by
the unrestrained market include the very cultural resources that the
40. RAWLS, supra note 22, at 15.
41. RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES
OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM 22 (1998).
42. Id. at 24.
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market relies on to sustain itself. Daniel Bell argues that the success of
capitalism has led to the replacement of its original, transcendent, and
austere “Protestant ethic” by a shallow hedonism that not only falls short
as a source of legitimation but also provokes the emergence of a culture
of anticapitalism.43 A similar point has been made by John Gray more
recently. Although nineteenth-century laissez-faire relied on a background
culture of “saving, civic pride, respectability, [and] ‘family values,’”
these commitments have now been rendered “profitless museum pieces”
by the relentless insistence of contemporary globalisation that “choice is
the only undisputed value.”44 The point about loss of civic pride is reinforced
by Robert Putnam, who stresses the extent to which civic community in
the United States has been eroded by “‘corporate delocalization.’”45
Yet another shortcoming of the market from a pluralist perspective is
identified by Michael Walzer. According to Walzer, the tendency of the
market, unless checked and balanced, is not only to neglect or marginalise
some important human goods, but also to distort our understanding of
others: “[M]oney is insidious, and market relations are expansive. A
radically laissez-faire economy would be like a totalitarian state,
invading every other sphere, dominating every other distributive process.
It would transform every social good into a commodity. This is market
imperialism.”46 Healthcare, for example, comes to be seen more as a
saleable commodity than a basic need.47 This kind of false commensuration
of distinct values by money has real consequences for people’s lives,
leading to public policies under which important goods are seen as
appropriately for sale to those who can afford them rather than
distributed in ways that reflect more faithfully the distinct kinds of value
they have for people.
To the extent that a society based on economic laissez-faire neglects
or damages or distorts significant human goods, it thereby violates the
fundamental commitments of liberal pluralism. Clearly, it places limits
on the value diversity to which liberal pluralists are committed. Further,
a society that neglects or damages those ways of life that emphasise
43. DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 54–80 (1976).
44. JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 37–38
(1998).
45. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 282–83 (2000).
46. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
119–20 (1983).
47. Id. at 86–91.
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“nonmarket” values is also objectionable from the perspective of the
pluralist commitment to accommodating reasonable disagreement about
the good life. When success in the market is the sole route to human
flourishing, it becomes harder to dissent or depart from those ways of
life that are sanctioned by the market. It follows that people’s capacity
for autonomy is also reduced because their options are narrowed. Most
fundamentally, such a society falls short of an adequate respect for value
plurality because it fails to take seriously enough those many values,
virtues, and considerations that the market alone does not promote.
IV. EGALITARIAN LIBERALISM
So far I have argued that, although pluralism points towards liberalism
in general, a classical-liberal or laissez-faire approach to distributive
justice carries major costs from a pluralist point of view. Reliance on
the market alone, although it does generate certain goods and virtues,
neglects or diminishes others. The next question is whether the egalitarian
alternative, distinguished by its willingness to redistribute wealth and
opportunities through state intervention, is likely to do any better, again
in pluralist terms.
Here it may immediately be thought that the egalitarian approach is
bound to do better because it retains the market and its benefits while
adding, through government action, attention to those other goods that
the market neglects or downgrades. Thus, egalitarian-liberal policies, it
may be argued, stand a better chance of satisfactorily promoting not only
the values of the market but also public goods, equality or social justice,
security, long-term commitments, community, and so forth. Such an
approach seems to promise the best of both worlds.
I believe this is basically correct, but there are qualifications to be
acknowledged. A comparison between laissez-faire and egalitarian
liberalism is not simply a comparison between the gains and losses of a
pure market system on one side and all the advantages of both market
and government on the other. First, laissez-faire does not, of course,
turn its back on government entirely. Markets always depend on
government to some degree, for example, to maintain the legal system
necessary to adjudicate and enforce contracts. It remains true, nevertheless,
that laissez-faire views do place greater reliance on the market, and
correspondingly less on government, compared with egalitarian positions.
Most importantly, egalitarian views depart from laissez-faire in their
commitment to economic redistribution. Consequently, egalitarians
have a pluralist case against the proponents of laissez-faire if they can
show that state redistribution promotes those values neglected, damaged,
or distorted by the market.
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Second, though, egalitarians should concede that the addition of
nonmarket to market values will not be without cost. As noted earlier, a
fundamental insight of pluralism is that distinct goods cannot always be
combined without loss: to emphasise one value may be to sacrifice or
reduce or inhibit another. In the case of egalitarian liberalism, the goods
of the market may well be diminished by greater attention to other
values. Greater equality may come at the price of less liberty, more
security may mean less enterprise, and so on. Indeed, I have argued that
costs seem to follow necessarily from benefits in some cases. If
workplace flexibility always brings short-termism and insecurity to some
degree, then attempts to ameliorate these problems are likely to come at
some cost to flexibility.
So, the question for pluralists is not whether the goods of the market
alone are outweighed by those of the market and government combined,
but rather which combination of market and government is superior: that
of laissez-faire or that of egalitarian redistribution. I think that the
balance struck by the egalitarian form of liberalism should be more
attractive to pluralists than that proposed by laissez-faire. This claim is
hard to demonstrate conclusively, but here are some considerations that
address the pluralist principles set out earlier, considerations that if not
conclusive are at least persuasive.
First, there are good reasons to think that egalitarianism will do a
better job than laissez-faire when it comes to maximising value
diversity. The key feature of liberalism as a whole that recommends it in
terms of diversity is the liberal emphasis on individual liberty; this is
common ground between classical and egalitarian liberals. But the
classical-liberal understanding of individual liberty as a purely negative
matter of noninterference is a thin interpretation of what liberty consists
in, leading to reduced prospects for diversity compared with those that
flow from a richer notion of liberty. Negative liberty is consistent with
the absence of any real opportunity to follow one’s bliss, as in cases
where the necessary material resources are lacking. Egalitarian liberals,
on the other hand, tend to insist on the value of “effective freedom,”
requiring not merely noninterference but also access to resources, which
in turn will not be possible for significant numbers of people in the
absence of state redistribution.48 Alternatively, those egalitarians, like

48. See, e.g., ADAM SWIFT, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A BEGINNERS’ GUIDE
STUDENTS AND POLITICIANS 55–59 (2001).
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Berlin and Rawls, who concede that “liberty” itself should be conceived
negatively, add that we must also attend to “the conditions of its
exercise.”49 This demands, in effect, not just noninterference but also
positive capacity, which again requires, in practical terms, redistributive
action by the state.50 Egalitarians, in short, have a more realistic
appreciation than do the supporters of laissez-faire of what it takes to
create diversity.
A similar case for redistributive intervention can be made with respect
to the diversity of ways of life implied by reasonable disagreement about
the good. As argued above, a significant range of legitimate ways of life
will be eliminated or threatened in a society in which market relations
are unchecked. Consequently, intervention will be needed to preserve
those ways of life, or at least a fair opportunity for their survival. In this
connection, Will Kymlicka, for example, argues against policies of
“benign neglect” under which vulnerable cultural minorities are merely
tolerated rather than offered any public assistance in their struggle to
survive.51 Under laissez-faire, these groups are likely to be “outbid” in
the economic competition for scarce resources such as land that may be
essential to their identity.52 Given the value of cultural membership to
human well-being, there is a strong case for public intervention to
prevent market-based distribution from diminishing cultural diversity.
Finally, an egalitarian approach is more likely to satisfy the pluralist
commitment to individual autonomy. The negative liberty of laissezfaire is consistent with widespread heteronomy, the uncritical acceptance
of conventional norms and ways of life—those aspects of Victorian
culture excoriated by Mill are cases in point. Without effective freedom
in the form of real opportunities for education and employment, critical
reflection is likely to be a capacity enjoyed only by a minority.
Moreover, there is a link between individual autonomy and state
redistribution in Kymlicka’s case for state-sponsored cultural rights
already mentioned. For Kymlicka, cultural membership is important not
for its own sake but as a necessary context for individual autonomy,
providing a framework for critical judgment.53 If redistributive policies
promote cultural diversity, then they may also promote autonomy.

49. BERLIN, LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 45.
50. Berlin writes: “The case for social legislation or planning, for the Welfare
State and socialism, can be constructed with as much validity from consideration of the
claims of negative liberty as from those of its positive brother . . . .” Id. at 38–39.
51. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 108–15 (1995).
52. See id. at 109.
53. Id. at 82–84.
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V. WELFARE OR RESOURCES?
Supposing that liberal pluralists ought to be egalitarians, what form
should liberal-pluralist redistribution take? What ought to be made more
equal? In Dworkin’s hugely influential account, the basic sense of
equality for liberals is the injunction to treat people with “equal concern
and respect”54 or “as equals.”55 According to Dworkin, there are two
main rival interpretations of what this requires in the field of distributive
justice: “equality of welfare” and “equality of resources.”56 What
position should pluralists take in this debate?
The basic idea of welfare, as presented by Dworkin, is of happiness or
well-being.57 Its immediate appeal, in contrast with a focus on resources, is
that welfare seems more fundamental, offering attention to ends rather
than means only. Two people may have the same income but one may
be less happy or fulfilled than the other. Dworkin distinguishes between
three main versions of welfare theory: “success” theories, in which
welfare consists in the fulfilment of a person’s goals or preferences;
“conscious-state” theories, in which welfare is equated with pleasure or
enjoyment; and “objective” theories that set out what people ought to
enjoy or pursue as goals.58
Dworkin finds many problems with the welfare outlook. The
conscious-state version does not get at what is fundamental because
enjoyment in itself is not usually what matters most to people; what
matters most to people is what they enjoy.59 Both conscious-state and
success theories require the satisfaction of subjective preferences that
may constitute bad reasons for distribution.60 Such preferences may be
inherently inegalitarian or prejudiced, or impossible to fulfil, or
generated by expensive tastes. Objective theories avoid these problems
with the variable content of subjective preferences, but only at the price
of setting up accounts of what people ought to want, which are

54. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1978).
55. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY
11 (2000).
56. Id. at 12.
57. Id. at 19.
58. Id. at 16–18, 45–47.
59. Id. at 44.
60. Id. at 45–46.
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controversial in themselves and illiberal when imposed against people’s
actual preferences.61
What view will pluralists take of welfare theories? Like Dworkin,
they will be uncomfortable with the more subjective versions. For
pluralists, these are fundamentally monistic because they all make the
satisfaction of preferences overriding, as in the case of preference
utilitarianism mentioned earlier. The case of objective theories of
welfare is less obvious. Pluralists will join Dworkin in objecting to
accounts of welfare that are very narrow or dominated by one or a few
super values, or that consist of a single, thickly described way of life.
But might it be possible to give an objective account of welfare that is
compatible with pluralism? After all, pluralists do typically accept some
objective framework of universal values; that is what distinguishes them
from relativists. Might such a framework not accommodate many
different goods and ways of life in a manner that satisfies the basic
insights of pluralism? I shall return to this possibility later.
What about Dworkin’s favoured alternative to the welfare approach,
the resources view? On this view, what ought to be equalised is not
welfare but people’s access to those resources that are necessary to any
good life.62 As a model for this ideal, Dworkin imagines an auction in
which castaways on a desert island occupy an equal starting point from
which they bid for what they want using equal amounts of an agreed
common currency—clamshells in Dworkin’s example.63 After the
auction, people’s resources will vary as a result of the choices they make
or the accidents that befall them. When the latter amount to “brute bad
luck,” Dworkin argues for compensation.64 In his “hypothetical insurance
market,” people are assumed to want to protect themselves against such
misfortunes, contributing compulsorily to a central fund from which they
will be compensated if necessary.65 This models the safety net institutions
of a welfare state.
Pluralists will immediately have doubts about the resources approach
as outlined so far. Initially it seems that Dworkin is using his auction
device to identify what counts as resources: these are whatever people
are willing to bid for in order to pursue their ends. This would invite a
charge of common currency monism, whether the currency is
clamshells, money, or market preferences. That objection is reinforced
by Dworkin’s account of the hypothetical insurance scheme. Again, the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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assumption appears to be that any disadvantage that arises in the wake of
the initial fair distribution is remediable in terms of a single currency,
the money paid into the scheme.
In fact things are more complicated than this because Dworkin later
defines resources independently of market preferences. Indeed, he
distinguishes between two distinct kinds of resources: “impersonal
resources,” which include money, material goods, and possessions; and
“personal resources,” or qualities of mind and body, which include
intelligence, strength, and talent.66 People can bid on impersonal resources
in the auction but not on personal resources. In effect, the insurance
scheme uses impersonal resources to compensate people for morally
relevant disadvantages arising from poor personal resources. The classic
example is compensation for a physical disability such as blindness.
However, a pluralist will remain dissatisfied. Amartya Sen makes the
point that the effect of the resources approach is to direct public policy
attention to the distribution of a relatively narrow range of material
resources rather than of the more fundamental goods that those resources
are supposed to enable.67 A pregnant woman and a man of the same age
may possess equal resources in the form of income and wealth, yet the
woman will have disadvantages to overcome in order to live well that
the man will not have.68 Between the provision of the resources and
people’s ability to convert them into actual capacities to live well, there
may well be a gap.
Dworkin tries to meet this point with his impersonal-personal distinction.
The impersonal resources of the man and the pregnant woman are equal
but their personal resources are not; therefore, there is a prima facie case
for compensation for the pregnant woman. But this move can be seen as
reinforcing the pluralist point. No amount of impersonal resources, such
as income and wealth, will equalise the positions of the two people.
Another way of putting this is to say that the common currency
compensation, usually monetary, envisaged by the resources view is not
the only means necessary or adequate to remedy disadvantage. Depending
on the circumstances, disadvantage may be more appropriately remedied
by other forms of public action such as medical treatment, support
services such as equipment and carers, and environmental or political or

66.
67.
68.

Id. at 300.
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 33–34, 36–38 (1992).
Id. at 27.
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cultural changes. That is to say, “disadvantage is plural,” as Jonathan
Wolff and Avner De-Shalit express it.69 There are distinct kinds or
dimensions of disadvantage, each calling for its own kind of remedy.
Conversely, the goal of egalitarian justice cannot be, for pluralists, the
equalisation of a single good that serves all purposes, whether this be
conceived as welfare or resources. No single good serves all purposes.
Welfare, conceived as preference satisfaction, does not address all
disadvantages because preferences can adapt in such a way that they are
satisfied even in obvious cases of injustice—those who experience
nothing but injustice can come to expect nothing else.70 Resources,
conceived as all-purpose means such as money, do not necessarily
convert to well-being.
VI. RESOURCES OR CAPABILITIES?
Instead of resources, Sen proposes that egalitarian distribution should
focus on “capabilities.” On this view, what is most important is “[a]
person’s capability to achieve functionings that he or she has reason to
value.”71 This requires more than resources alone because resources
may not be convertible to actual capability. On the other hand, Sen does
not demand actual functioning or achievement as the goal of distributive
policy—he wants to leave room for people to choose which functionings
are most important to them. He often refers to the goal he advocates in
terms of freedom: “our freedom to promote objectives we have reasons
to value,”72 or “the freedom to achieve.”73
What is the content of the capabilities? Sen prefers to leave this open,
referring only to “valuable functionings that make up our lives” or
“objectives we have reasons to value.”74 Again, he wants to accommodate
choice, including democratic choice. This approach contrasts somewhat
with that of Martha Nussbaum, who spells out the “central human
functional capabilities” in a ten-point list. The most recent version of
the list contains the following headings: life; bodily health; bodily
integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason;
affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s environment.75
Each item is essential to human well-being, so that a life that lacks any
one of the capabilities cannot to that extent be rightly called a good

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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human life. This in turn becomes a political principle, involving claims
of justice and rights. A society that does not do its best to secure the
capabilities of all its members is to that extent unjust and in violation of
their rights as human beings.
The capabilities approach will be very attractive to pluralists. It is in
fact a pluralist position. Thus, Sen acknowledges that the approach
raises a question about how to select and rank the most important
functionings and capabilities, implying that there is no hierarchy or
common currency for these.76 Nussbaum’s pluralist credentials are more
explicit still because she makes it clear that the items on her list are
“separate components.”77 Each capability represents a separate good,
distinct from and not reducible to the others, and no item is intrinsically
more important than any other in a sense that justifies an abstract scheme
of ranking.78 To say that the capabilities are distinct, irreducible, and not
subject to any absolute ranking is in effect to identify them as
incommensurable values.
The approaches of Sen and Nussbaum are also in line with the general
principles I drew from the pluralist outlook earlier. To argue that all of
the capabilities must be promoted as constitutive of a good human life
and a just society is to endorse the pluralist norm of diversity of goods.
To insist further, as does Nussbaum, that each capability has “multiple
realizability”—openness to a wide range of legitimate interpretations in
different cultural settings—is consistent both with value diversity and
with the pluralist acknowledgement of reasonable disagreement.79 On
the other hand, Nussbaum’s commitment to cultural diversity is
contained within a universalist framework, and this too is in keeping
with the pluralist outlook as I interpret it. Nussbaum’s universalism is
marked by her conception of the capabilities as beneficial for any
genuinely human life and by her “core idea” that what makes a life
genuinely human is that it is self-directed: the life of “a dignified free
being who shapes his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with
others, rather than being passively shaped or pushed around by the world

76. SEN, supra note 67, at 45–46.
77. NUSSBAUM, supra note 10, at 81.
78. Two capabilities, practical reason and affiliation, are said to be “of special
importance” because they “organize and suffuse all the others, making their pursuit truly
human.” Id. at 82. But this is not the same as ranking or common currency commensuration.
79. Id. at 77 (emphasis omitted).
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in the manner of a ‘flock’ or ‘herd’ animal.”80 This fits with the pluralist
norm of individual autonomy.81
Dworkin, however, denies that the capabilities approach adds anything
of value to what is already in his resources framework. He sees two
main problems. First, there is the ranking difficulty acknowledged by
Sen. How can, and why should, public policy equalize capabilities when
people value different capabilities differently—some emphasising
physical skills, others intellectual attainments, and so forth?82
Sen responds that although there can be no relative weighting of
capabilities that applies in all cases—it is not true that capability A is
always more important than B—there can at least be a “‘dominance
partial order’” that tells us that “[h]aving more of each relevant functioning
or capability is a[n] . . . improvement” without having to specify precisely
how much of each will produce the greatest improvement in a particular
case.83 Capabilities are always valuable, but how valuable they are
relative to each other in particular cases is a matter that can be left to the
judgment of those affected in the case at hand. The public policy
implication is that government should promote all capabilities evenly
across the board, or perhaps some especially salient set of capabilities
responding to especially salient forms of disadvantage, leaving to
individuals the choice of whether or not to exercise those capabilities as
actual achievement.84
Another kind of ranking problem arises when individuals choose to
pursue functionings that are to some extent in conflict with one another,
such as when a person wants both a successful career and a family life.

80. Id. at 72.
81. In her recent work, Nussbaum distinguishes between autonomy and practical
reason, arguing that the former is tied to the rejection of God as an ultimate moral
authority, hence incompatible with many religious beliefs, and insisting that she is
committed only to the latter. Martha C. Nussbaum, Political Liberalism and Respect: A
Response to Linda Barclay, 4 NORDIC J. PHIL. 25, 40–41 (2003), available at http://ej.lib.
cbs.dk/index.php/sats/article/view/437/473. But there is no good reason to write the
rejection of God into the idea of personal autonomy. What is essential to that idea, and
to practical reasoning, is the notion of critical reflection: a reasoned questioning and possible
revision of one’s own conception of the good. That need not involve the rejection of
God as an ultimate moral authority. One can consistently believe that both the options
between which one chooses, and the reason with which one reflects on those options, are
ultimately gifts of God.
82. DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 299–300.
83. SEN, supra note 67, at 46 (emphasis omitted).
84. More generally, Sen argues that it is a mistake to demand “overprecision” from
judgments of well-being and inequality. Id. at 48. Striving for “totally complete and
clear-cut orderings can do less than justice to the nature of these concepts.” Id. We
should recall here that Dworkin’s own project is one of interpretation of his fundamental
concept of equal concern and respect. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue Revisited, 113
ETHICS 106, 106–07 (2002).
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This points to a deep-seated issue in the capability view as a whole:
some of the capabilities may collide with each other. In Nussbaum’s
list, for example, the career-family tension is an aspect of a potential
conflict at a more general level between affiliation and the material
dimension of control over environment. What should we do when such
a conflict comes to the surface?
The capabilities theorists might reply that such a case presents a
genuine dilemma, but a dilemma not just for the capabilities view but
also for the real-life experience that the capabilities view accurately and
properly reflects. Thus, Nussbaum, in her recent work, sees such conflicts
as inescapably “tragic,” involving serious loss of value whichever way
we go.85 The only sensible public policy response is to try to make
arrangements such that these tragic choices do not arise in the first place.
In the career-family case, for example, work commitments might be
structured in ways that are more sympathetic to families.
This response is realistic and sensible, but if I am correct in my
general account of the links between pluralism and liberalism, then
pluralists may be able to say more than this. To begin with, they can
argue that even in tragic cases some decisions may be better than others
because there can be decisive reasons for choosing between conflicting
incommensurables within a particular context. Some individuals’
background ethical and personal commitments point more strongly
towards career than family, or vice versa.86 Moreover, the idea of pluralism
itself implies certain general norms—value diversity, accommodation of
reasonable disagreement, and promotion of individual autonomy—that
can serve as critical standards for public policy, and that together point
to a certain kind of liberal political framework within which these
decisions should be made. I have argued that, when it comes to
questions of distributive justice, this framework will be egalitarian rather
than laissez-faire. Within the egalitarian approach, I have so far tended
toward its capabilities variant in contrast with the welfare and resources
alternatives distinguished by Dworkin.

85. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of CostBenefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1007 (2000).
86. Nussbaum herself argued for the possibility of reasoned choice under pluralism
in her earlier works. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND
ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 2001); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
Reading for Life, in LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 230
(1990).
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Dworkin’s opposition to capabilities is still on the table, however. His
second main objection is that, in Sen’s version at least, the capabilities
view is open to two different readings. On one of these, Sen’s view
collapses into equality of welfare, on the other it collapses into equality
of resources. In either case, capabilities is not the distinct and superior
alternative that Sen claims it to be.
Capabilities collapse into welfare, according to Dworkin, if we are
talking about capabilities for “‘complex’ achievements of happiness,”
such as “‘being happy, having self-respect, taking part in the life of the
community, and so on.’”87 This kind of welfare talk is understandable
because people usually want resources not for their own sake but in
order to pursue ends such as those listed. But to focus politically on
capabilities rather than resources is to risk sliding into a commitment to
ensure people’s “overall capacity to achieve these goals.”88 To insist on
equalizing people’s capacity to achieve happiness or fulfilment in these
respects is, for Dworkin, “barely coherent and certainly bizarre” and
“frightening” in its implications for public policy.89
On the other hand, if we are talking only about the more basic
capabilities, then Dworkin believes that Sen’s view collapses into a
resources position.90 On this alternative reading, Sen is concerned only
to address morally relevant disadvantages that arise from unchosen
circumstances, not from choices. But if that is so, Dworkin argues, then
Sen is concerned only with disadvantage arising from lack of impersonal
or personal resources.91 If Sen is concerned only to equalize resources in
these terms, then his position is no different from Dworkin’s.
Overall, Dworkin concedes that people want resources to do things
with, but he insists that public policy should concern itself only with the
equalisation of resources, impersonal and personal, not with capabilities
to achieve well-being. The latter, involving judgments about the content
of well-being or welfare, should be a matter for individuals themselves,
given equal resources.
How can the defenders of capabilities reply? First, do capabilities
really collapse into welfare claims? An important issue here is whether
we are talking about welfare in a subjective or objective sense, but I
shall come back to this. A more immediate defence would appeal to the
distinction between capabilities and functioning. If Sen and Nussbaum
were demanding that government guarantee particular kinds of

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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functioning or achievement then their position would indeed be extreme,
but in fact they are asking only for the securing of capabilities or, as Sen
puts it, the freedom to achieve. This does not seem so bizarre or
threatening. Dworkin appears to concede this when he argues that there
is a “danger of sliding into . . . the false goal of equal welfare or wellbeing.”92 Here the complaint seems to be not that capabilities are the
same as welfare, but that the first leads to the second by way of a
slippery slope. But Dworkin does not show that the slope is all that
slippery. If capabilities generate rights, as Sen and Nussbaum imply, it
remains open to people to exercise those rights or not as they choose.
At this point Dworkin might say that I have made capabilities seem
more attractive only by collapsing them into resources. Here the
defenders of capabilities need to show that there are forms of morally
relevant disadvantage that do not derive from deficient resources,
whether impersonal or personal, and that consequently cannot be
adequately addressed by additional impersonal resources.
There does seem to be at least one important class of cases that is hard
to account for in terms of resources alone. This is where disadvantage
flows not from poverty or personal disability but from social conditions,
especially widespread attitudes that set up barriers to people’s doing
what they want with their lives. Andrew Williams has suggested the
example of women having fewer chances than men of finding congenial
partners in a society still characterised by gender stereotyping.93 In such
a society, fewer men than women will be willing to make domestic tasks
rather than career ambitions their dominant focus, or even to make
homemaking a significant commitment. This creates a degree of
difficulty for career-minded women that their male counterparts do not
face.
Dworkin explains this sort of case as an instance of an obstacle to a
complex ambition caused by “the tastes and preferences of others.”94 In
such a case, it is hard for me to do what I want because my goals require
resources that other people happen to be bidding for too. In other words
my situation is akin to having an expensive vocation or hobby. This is
really a welfare complaint, and therefore not a legitimate cause for
public concern.

92.
93.
94.

Id. at 302 (emphasis added).
Andrew Williams, Dworkin on Capability, 113 ETHICS 23 (2002).
Dworkin, supra note 84, at 138.
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But this response misses the point. The case of reasonable ambitions
thwarted by obstructive attitudes does not seem much like a case of
expensive tastes. Collecting rare stamps is a personal choice undeserving of
public support, but having very basic life prospects impeded by the
beliefs of others seems more fundamental. Moreover, in the congenial
partners example, what Dworkin refers to as the “preferences of others”
include the kind of narrow and prejudiced beliefs that he elsewhere
condemns, in his arguments against utilitarianism, as inherently
inegalitarian and therefore illegitimate influences on public policy that
should be trumped by individual rights.95
Of course, even if we accept social conditions as a source of
disadvantage not captured by lack of resources alone, what kind of
public action can address the problem is a further question. But here too
the capabilities approach can claim an advantage because it emphasises,
along with the plural nature of disadvantage, the plurality of appropriate
responses to disadvantage. Widespread prejudices are unlikely to be
dissolved by distributing additional resources, such as monetary
compensation, to those who suffer from those prejudices. But other
forms of public action, such as public statements and advertising aimed
at the community at large, may do better.
VII. CONCLUSION
I have argued that a liberal reading of the Berlinian concept of value
pluralism suggests an egalitarian rather than a laissez-faire approach to
distributive justice. Within egalitarianism the debate between welfare,
resource, and capabilities theories is more finely balanced. Pluralists
will be unhappy with subjective versions of the welfare view, but some
objective versions may be compatible with pluralism. The resource
paradigm may seem too narrow at first sight, but in Dworkin’s hands it
can be made to cover many of the cases that would concern pluralists.
On the whole, though, I am inclined to believe that it is the capabilities
model that meets pluralist requirements most fully, for the reasons that
emerged in the last section. Pluralists should accept that, just as the
human good is plural, so too is morally relevant disadvantage. The
95. Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 155–59
(Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). Dworkin would reply that “equality of resources
presupposes a society free from such injustices”; that is, it is an ideal theory in the light
of which he too would condemn the attitudes in question. Dworkin, supra note 84, at
137. To this the defenders of capabilities might respond that such attitudes are part of
social reality here and now, and ought not simply to be assumed away even for idealtheoretical purposes. For this and other more general differences between the resources
and capabilities views, see Roland Pierik & Ingrid Robeyns, Resources Versus
Capabilities: Social Endowments in Egalitarian Theory, 55 POL. STUD. 133 (2007).
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capabilities view championed by Sen and Nussbaum reflects this more
completely than the alternatives.
It is worth asking, however, what the implications would be from a
pluralist perspective if Dworkin were correct in his claim that
capabilities collapse into either welfare or resources. First, if capabilities
collapsed into welfare in its subjective sense, then that would be
objectionable to pluralists for the reason given earlier: capabilities would
then reduce to items of preference satisfaction, which would become
overriding or commensurating. It seems to me that Nussbaum’s position, in
which the capabilities are spelled out independently of preferences, is
less open to this objection than Sen’s.
On the other hand, if the capabilities view reduced to an objective
welfare claim, the pluralist response would depend, as suggested earlier,
on how accommodating this claim was of distinct plural values.
Pluralism as I have interpreted it is a theory of human well-being, but of
human well-being as having a plurality of distinct dimensions, each of
which has its own unique ethical force.
This view may not satisfy Dworkin if he insists on strict adherence to
the principle of neutrality he has generally advocated in political
thought.96 But if there is a dispute between Dworkin and pluralists on
this point, I think the latter will be on fairly secure ground because strict
neutrality is such an implausible ideal. Dworkin’s own view depends on
a substantial ethical commitment to equal concern and respect, an ideal
that is—wrongly, I believe—not accepted in all cultures. Further, his
understanding of basic equality involves a commitment to the value of
individual autonomy that is, again wrongly, even more controversial.
Capabilities theory is not neutral, but neither is Dworkin’s position.
Liberal pluralists will be content with this. Pluralism requires diversity
and accommodation of reasonable disagreement, not neutrality.97
What if capabilities collapse into resources? In that case Dworkin’s
point is not that the capabilities approach is defective, merely that it adds
nothing to resources—that it says the same thing as the resources
96. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, Liberalism, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181 (1985).
97. For doubts about Dworkin’s claims to neutrality in the context of equality of
resources, see Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, Liberalism, Neutrality, and
Equality of Welfare vs. Equality of Resources, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85 (1987). Eric
Nelson argues that capabilities theory is not neutral either, but that is not a problem if
capabilities theorists replace neutrality with a more realistic ideal of accommodation.
Eric Nelson, From Primary Goods to Capabilities: Distributive Justice and the Problem
of Neutrality, 36 POL. THEORY 93 (2008).
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approach only in a different language. But where does that leave
Dworkin’s declared opposition to Berlinian pluralism?
This brings me back to my starting point. I began with Dworkin’s
motivation for rejecting pluralism, namely the claim that it paralyses
reform. For Dworkin, to allow the distinctive pluralist view that conflicting
values may be incommensurable is to allow that such values confront
each other like “independent sovereign powers,” a confrontation that can
be resolved only by a groundless act of will.98 This apparently rules out
the possibility of reasoned agreement on the terms of just distribution.
But this cannot be right if my argument is accepted that capabilities
theories are pluralist theories. For then it turns out that at least one
interpretation of pluralism and its implications is on all fours with
Dworkin’s own approach to distributive justice—assuming that
capabilities are resources. It turns out that pluralism does not lead to the
indeterminacy that Dworkin fears.
Far from being politically open-ended, the concept of pluralism, I
have argued, implies norms of diversity, reasonable disagreement, and
individual autonomy that together point to an egalitarian-liberal political
framework and, within that framework, to the capabilities approach.
Even if capabilities did reduce to resources—perhaps especially if that is
so—Dworkin would have no reason to be fearful of pluralist forms of
argument, properly understood. Pluralism does not amount to a neat
formula that answers all questions, but neither does it sanction a
surrender, through indeterminacy, to an unrestricted market.

98.
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